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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN CLINICAL DECISION-MAKING: 
RETHINKING LIABILITY 
ABSTRACT 
This article theorises, within the context of the law of England and Wales, the potential 
outcomes in negligence claims against clinicians and software development companies (SDCs) 
by patients injured due to AI system (AIS) use with human clinical supervision. Currently, a 
clinician will likely shoulder liability via a negligence claim for allowing defects in an AIS’s 
outputs to reach patients. We question if this is ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to clinical users: we 
argue that a duty of care to patients ought to be recognised on the part of SDCs as well as 
clinicians. As an alternative to negligence claims, we propose ‘risk pooling’ which utilises 
insurance. Here, a fairer construct of shared responsibility for AIS use could be created between 
the clinician and the SDC; thus, allowing a rapid mechanism of compensation to injured 
patients via insurance. 
KEYWORDS: artificial intelligence, duty of care, negligence, risk pooling, tort 
I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND HEALTHCARE 
Decision-making for patients in the clinical environment has historically been led by the 
clinical professions. The development and limited introduction of AI systems (AISs) into the 
healthcare sector constitutes a novel, non-human aspect to clinical decision-making.1 In this 
paper we consider AISs which are advisory rather than autonomous; they do not directly 
interact with patients, but are designed to aid and influence the clinician’s thought processes. 
In the UK, the National Health Service (NHS) has started some preliminary collaborations with 
 
1 JL De Fauw et al., ‘Clinically applicable deep learning for diagnosis and referral in retinal disease’ (2018) 
Nature Medicine 1342 
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software development companies (SDCs).2 These collaborations indicate the possibility for 
AISs to be formally adopted into the UK’s healthcare system at some point in the future. An 
AIS may be designed to learn from its experiences and adjust its outputs without being 
specifically programmed to do so (‘machine learning’).3 The process by which the system 
calculates its outputs could be sufficiently complex to effectively render it inscrutable to a non-
expert user, a black box4 in common parlance. These characteristics increase the risk that an 
AIS could produce a clinically inappropriate recommendation and that the defective logic 
involved goes undetected. This risk necessitates some clinical oversight of the system’s outputs 
to ensure the AIS’s recommendations are safe and relevant to the patient. 
There is currently a lack of clarity surrounding the sufficiency of legal mechanisms for liability 
when applied to malfunctioning AISs. In 2017a House of Lords Select Committee 
recommended that the Law Commission investigate whether current legal principles were 
adequate to address liability issues when using AI and to make recommendations in this area,5 
but a formal reference has not yet been made by the Government. In lieu of these 
recommendations we perform legal analysis of these issues within the jurisdiction of England 
and Wales. 
This paper will examine how the tort of negligence can be applied in the scenario where a 
clinician uses an AIS’s inappropriate recommendation and the patient comes to harm as a result. 
First, we identify the conditions which put the clinician at risk of carrying the burden of claims 
in this scenario and how the SDC could be able to limit their liability. We will argue that this 
situation is unfair to the clinical user as the clinical decision-making space has been modified 
 
2 D Campbell, ‘NHS to sign up patients for “virtual” A&E in tech revolution’ The Guardian (London, 23 May 
2019) <www.theguardian.com/society/2019/may/23/birmingham-to-begin-accident-and-emergency-online-chat-
service-in-tech-revolution-for-nhs-care/> accessed 8 March 2020 
3 J Turner, Robot rules: regulating artificial intelligence (Palgrave Macmillan 2019) 16 
4 Mukherjee, S. ‘A.I. Versus M.D.’ The New Yorker 27 March 2017 
<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/03/ai-versus-md> 
5 Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, AI in the UK: ready, willing and able? (HL 2017-19, 100) 135 
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by the SDC via their AIS. In the final sections of this paper we explore risk pooling as a possible 
solution which provides shared responsibility between SDCs and clinicians.  
A. Key stakeholders 
Clinicians may work as sole agents (e.g. a self-employed General Practitioner) as well as in 
groups (e.g. hospitals), often interchangeably. We use the term ‘clinician’ throughout to 
describe medically-trained staff working in either context. On the other hand, it would be 
extremely rare (but not impossible) for an AIS to be designed, developed, trained, tested, 
monitored, and updated by a single individual; software development is frequently undertaken 
by commercial enterprises.It is increasingly common to find interdisciplinary groups of 
technologists and clinicians working together. Here, we subsume clinicians involved in an 
interdisciplinary group as part of the SDC. However, at the point of care, clinicians are treated 
as a distinctive, independent professional grouping. 
II. HARM 
Whilst it might seem hard to envisage clinical professionals who lack specialist training 
heeding AISs which advise in specialist areas, this eventuality has happened, and its occurrence 
serves this paper as a useful vignette for discussion.  IBM’s ‘Watson for Oncology’ ‘assesses 
information from a patient’s medical record and displays potential treatment options ranked by 
level of confidence, based on training with supporting evidence’.6 Watson was deployed at UB 
Songdo Hospital in Mongolia, where it was reported that its suggestions were followed at a 
rate of almost 100 per cent by clinicians who had little or no training in cancer care.7 The 
system was reported to have inappropriately recommended the drug Taxane for a patient whose 
 
6 IBM (undated) IBM Watson for Oncology: What Watson for Oncology can do for your organization 
<https://www.ibm.com/products/clinical-decision-support-oncology> accessed 8 March 2020 
7 C Ross and I Swetlitz, (2017) ‘IBM pitched Watson as a revolution in cancer care. It's nowhere close.’ STAT 
News. <https://www.statnews.com/2017/09/05/watson-ibm-cancer/> accessed 8 March 2020 
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history would contraindicate the use of that drug.8  This error was noted by an oncology 
specialist,9 but it remains conceivable that a non-specialist clinician might not detect the error.10 
III. CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE 
Clinicians, and the hospitals in which they work, owe a duty of care to their patients.11 
Generally, patients are doubly vulnerable, by virtue of their health condition and relative lack 
of clinical knowledge. It remains the case that where a clinician has interpreted medical 
information and proceeds with a treatment plan that they have developed based on their clinical 
opinion, the clinician owes a duty of care towards their patient in the usual way. 
The example of IBM’s ‘Watson’ in Section II indicates that the clinician might rely upon an 
AIS to provide clinical recommendations. This poses a novel evidential problem for the 
claimant, as it is difficult to discern the relative influence of the human clinician and the non-
human AIS. The clinician could instead be seen as a third party, a conduit for medical decisions 
that have been generated outside of the relationship of care that the clinician has with their 
patient. 
Nevertheless, justice is not served by excluding claims where the clinician has chosen to use 
an AIS in providing treatment. To this end, some SDCs are adopting a posture that presents 
clinicians as the sole guardians of system safety. A description of IBM’s Watson for Oncology 
system asserts that ‘Watson does not make decisions on what a doctor should do. It makes 




10 The authors recognise that this scenario happened outside of England and Wales, but are using this as a 
historical example of AI system application in clinical decision-making which might be repeated or adopted in 
other regions. The authors are interested in the application of this scenario to the law of England and Wales as it 
is their home nation.  
11 Barnet v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428; Darnley v Croydon 
Health Services NHS Trust [2019] AC 831 
12 M Hengstler, E Enkel and S Duelli, ‘Applied artificial intelligence and trust – the case of autonomous 
vehicles and medical assistance devices’ (2016) 105 Technological Forecasting and Social Change 105, 115 
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trapped in a ‘moral crumple zone’13 where they become answerable for the AIS because of 
their choice to use the technology. Absorbing the moral responsibility for errors is a forceful 
argument for assigning full legal liability to clinicians, yet this is grossly unfair on clinicians 
as it disconnects accountability from the locus of control. Yet the clinician may act as an 
independent, knowledgeable intermediary between the software’s recommendations and the 
patient, but in practice is encumbered with the responsibility for computer-generated clinical 
advice over which they have only limited influence. It could be fairer for both the claimant and 
the clinician if the court entertained a form of joint liability, pooling the risk between the 
clinician and the SDC. 
Two key cases underpin the consideration of clinical conduct in almost all negligent treatment 
and diagnosis claims: Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee14 and Bolitho v City 
and Hackney Health Authority.15 Clinical conduct is not usually considered negligent per 
Bolam if it is in accordance with a responsible body of opinion, and thus satisfies the standards 
of other responsible medical professionals.  Bolitho requires that the standard relied upon has 
a logical basis. IBM promotes Watson for Oncology as a combination of the expertise of 
‘leading oncologists’ in cancer care with ‘the speed of IBM Watson to help clinicians as they 
consider individualised cancer treatments for their patients’.16 The court has held in Wilsher v 
Essex Area Health Authority17 that the duty of care can be discharged by referring to a senior 
knowledgeable colleague for assistance. A clinician might not be successful in declaring that 
digitised expertise in the form of an AIS is equivalent to human proficiency, but they might be 
successful in arguing that a SDC had presented their AIS as dispensing reliable expert advice. 
 
13 MC Elish, ‘Moral crumple zones: cautionary tales in human-robot interaction’ (2019) 5 Engaging Science, 
Technology and Society 40 <https://estsjournal.org/index.php/ests/article/view/260> accessed 8 March 2020 
14 [1957] 2 All ER 118 
15 [1998] AC 232 
16 IBM (undated) IBM Watson for Oncology: What Watson for Oncology can do for your organization 
<https://www.ibm.com/products/clinical-decision-support-oncology> accessed 8 March 2020 
17 [1987] QB 730 (CA); the case went to appeal in the House of Lords ([1988] AC 1074), but was concerned 
instead with causation and was silent on the question of referring to senior colleagues. 
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Thus, if an AIS such as Watson for Oncology is being presented by its SDC as dispensing 
expert advice, it would seem sensible for a clinician defendant to argue that in relying on the 
AIS, they are in fact acting in accordance with ‘a body of responsible medical opinion’.18 
The law does not presume to differentiate between contradictory clinical opinions.19  For 
instance, an AIS may create a recommendation that might receive less than majority support 
among the medical community. Such a discovery could indeed represent a scientific 
advancement. Even if this was contestable, reliance on an unconventional recommendation for 
treatment would not necessarily be a priori negligent.20 If the system’s outputs consisted of 
recommendations that were illogical, however, the claimant may be able to show that the duty 
of care had been breached by the clinician who acted on that recommendation.21 Indeed, the 
court might decide that for a clinician to abrogate their personal responsibility and instead 
delegate clinical decision-making to an AIS is conduct so specious that the claim could proceed 
on this ground. Consequently, if a clinician wishes to use AI technologies in treating patients 
and avoid breaching their duty of care, the cautious clinician would ideally be able to fully 
justify their decision-making independently of the AIS. 
Ordinarily, the clinician’s relationship with the patient is clear, but using an AIS introduces the 
‘third’ agent of the SDC. This complicates the identification of the entity which is the primary 
cause of harm. Neither the SDC, nor an advisory AIS which does not have physical contact 
with the patient would have been able to directly cause harm on their own; the clinician would 
have been the gateway to the AIS being able to harm via its recommendations to the clinician. 
 
18 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 
19 Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1985] 1 All ER 635 
20 As above 
Both Simms v Simms and An NHS Trust [2002] EWHC 2734 and De Freitas v O’Brien [1993] 4 Med LR 281, 
CA endorse minority opinions as being non-negligent. 
21 Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232, 243 held that if ‘it 
can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is 
entitled to hold that the body of opinion is not reasonable or responsible’. 
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Hence, ‘but for’ the clinician’s conduct, the AIS’s harmful output would not have influenced 
the patient’s treatment at all. 
The example of the use of IBM’s Watson provides a scenario to which causation may be 
discussed. Were a patient to come to harm due to inappropriate drug recommendations from 
an AIS being adopted, it might be possible to argue that ‘but for’ the AIS’s presence, the injury 
would not have occurred. A generalist clinician without specialist training in a specific illness 
(e.g. oncology), would not have been able to attempt to treat that illness; they would have been 
unable to choose or administer any specialist drugs as they would not have known which drugs 
could have been appropriate for the patient’s condition. Consider this hypothetical scenario. 
Suppose the clinician has no other colleague to refer the patient to, yet if timely treatment is 
not provided the patient could suffer. The clinician’s employing hospital has provided the AIS 
for this specific purpose. Under these conditions, a reasonable clinician may feel compelled to 
use that AI system. In this situation, ‘but for’ the presence of the AIS there would have been 
no attempt to treat the patient’s illness, thus no selection or administration of an inappropriate 
drug, but potentially averting more serious consequences from non-intervention. 
In the absence of a valid defence, a claim made by a patient against a clinician who has used a 
defective AIS as part of their treatment plan may be irresistible. One could argue that the court 
would quite rightly find a clinician who follows an AIS’s recommendations without careful 
consideration of the consequences has acted with negligence. Yet it does not appear to be ‘fair, 
just and reasonable’22 for negligence liability to be extended only to clinicians, given the role 
of the SDC in a shared endeavour with clinicians in developing and deploying AIS. When an 
SDC claims that its product is both dispensing state of the art knowledge, but with the 
additional qualification that the clinician is to make the final decision of how to act on this 
 
22 Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 
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knowledge, it is not unreasonable for a clinician to consider rejecting the use of an AIS until it 
can be proven that its outputs can be safely relied upon. If an SDC is unable to provide adequate 
reassurance to clinicians, clinicians would be ill-advised to take the risk of using those systems.  
It is the clinician’s responsibility to ensure that they are familiar with any tools they use. This 
includes awareness of the risks of AISs. However, if the clinician cannot scrutinise the AIS 
because of the ‘black box’ character of the algorithm, they will be unable to take appropriate 
steps to mitigate these risks. This merits an assessment of the conduct of the SDC to determine 
whether they have materially contributed to the overall risk of harm to the patient. 
IV. SOFTWARE DEVELOPER COMPANY’S NEGLIGENCE 
The discussion of clinical negligence in Section III raised the possibility that the SDC might 
also share liability in negligence. For the purposes of a claim based on joint liability the conduct 
of the SDC must be analysed separately. Donoghue v Stevenson 23  provides a distinctive 
illustration of the duty of care manufacturers owe to the end users of their products. In 
Donoghue, a drink was served to consumers in opaque glass bottles, which rendered safety 
inspections futile once the bottles had been sealed at the factory. Extending this principle by 
analogy, it could be argued that the SDC relies on the clinician to intervene where an AIS 
recommends a course of action that is potentially unsafe. However, even where a clinician 
exercises professional judgement, it may be impossible to prove the extent to which the 
clinician has come to their decision independently, without any degree of influence from the 
AIS. Therefore, a court will need to assess whether the SDC has taken all appropriate measures 
to mitigate the risk of harm to patients where their AIS is deployed in clinical settings. 
A. Duty of care 
 
23 [1932] AC 562 
 9 
 
As the caselaw on negligence has developed, the duty of care has been extended ‘incrementally 
and by analogy’ with established duty situations.24  Defendants cannot act with impunity, 
expecting that liability will rest with another party. The categories of relationship where a duty 
of care may be imposed can be expanded as novel situations arise. The Caparo25 criteria 
provide guidance as to where the court may be persuaded to broaden the scope of negligence 
liability and determine if a duty of care exists. They query 1) whether the harm resulting from 
the defendant’s conduct reasonably foreseeable; 2) whether the relationship between the parties 
is sufficiently proximate in law; and 3) if it is ‘fair, just, and reasonable’ to impose a duty of 
care on the defendant. The following discussion sketches out the potential liability of the SDC 
towards the patient using this framework. 
1. Foreseeability 
SDCs cannot say that they did not foresee that patients would be affected by their system’s 
outputs given that their system was specifically designed to advise patient care. The 
relationship between the patient and the AIS is undiluted even if mediated by a clinician as the 
patient’s data is processed by the system directly. A skilled professional in possession of 
knowledge who wilfully ignores it is ‘prima facie negligent’ when it is foreseeable that an 
injury could occur.26 This extends to technical professionals in the employ of the SDC. 
The SDC could argue that intermittent episodes of malfunctioning are not unprecedented.27 
AISs operate according to observations latent in the data, rather than the experiential and 
applied knowledge base which clinicians possess. SDCs are not be expected to have medical 
 
24 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] AC 736, [26]-[27] 
25 Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605  
26 D Rowland and JJ Rowland, ‘Competence and legal liability in the development of software for safety-related 
applications’ (1993) 2 Information & Communications Technology Law 229, 240 
27 T Petricek, ‘Miscomputation in software: learning to live with errors’ (2017) 1(2) The Art, Science and 
Engineering of Programming <https://programming-journal.org/2017/1/14/> accessed 8 March 2020 
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expertise, but a negligence claim might not be unreasonable if an SDC has released software 
for use in clinical environments. 
An alternative foreseeability scenario also exists. Should the AIS have a high frequency of 
accurate outputs desirable for clinical decision-making, the clinician may find their attention 
wanes when monitoring the effect of the system’s recommendations as applied to patients. This 
phenomenon can be described as an ‘atrophy of vigilance’. 28  When the device works 
consistently without issue, the user might begin to trust it even when they know that they should 
not, but this is in conflict with the clinician’s duty of care which would compel them to pay 
attention when using any kind of tool. 
If atrophy of vigilance can result in death or personal injury in the above safety critical 
situations, it might be considered a foreseeable consequence for AISs which provide rapid 
solutions and aim to lessen the cognitive burden for system users. Trusting an AIS which is 
usually reliable is a foreseeable consequence in the lifespan of an AIS; thus, it could be posited 
that there is an open the door for courts to find that SDCs owe a duty of care if harm eventuates 
due to a clinician’s foreseeable loss of attention whilst using their system. Were the courts to 
agree, a positive obligation from SDCs could be required to take human factors into account 
and design the system to ensure safety in the high-pressured clinical environment. Absence of 
such holistic design features could be taken as evidence of a negligent omission.  
2. Proximity 
To avoid liability claims, the SDC would attempt to position the clinician as the primary 
guardian of safety. Proximity, as understood in the tort of negligence, need not be solely 
geographical, instead it describes 
 
28 WR Freudenberg, ‘Nothing recedes like success? Risk analysis and the organizational amplification of risks’ 
(1992) 3(1) Risk: Issues in Health and Safety 1 
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‘such close and direct relations that the act complained of directly affects a person 
whom the person alleged to be bound to take care would know would be directly 
affected by his careless act’.29 
Within the clinical environment, this duty of care towards patients is held by both medical and 
non-medical staff as found in Darnley.30 
It is conceivable that a similar relationship might be considered to exist between an SDC and 
a patient if the SDC provided their system to be used specifically to aid patient care. The SDC’s 
position might be considered analogous to other professional roles within the clinical 
environment, for example radiologists or haematologists. These specialised clinicians can 
advise their colleagues on an interpretation of a medical image or on the appropriateness of 
administering a unit of blood product to a specific patient; and they frequently do this without 
ever having met the patient themselves. Specialised clinicians who are not directly at a patient’s 
bedside are expected to follow the same code of professional conduct as their fellow 
colleagues.31 In law, specialists are subject to the same duty of care as generalists, though the 
expected standard of care may differ. 
This matrix can be applied to the SDC which develops an AIS which accepts an input, 
processes it according to a specialised algorithm, and then generates a recommendation which 
purports to embody clinical expertise. However, the SDC is a third party detached from the 
bedside. Thus, an AIS may make recommendations which prompt a user’s actions, but this 
does not lessen a user’s duty to take care that their actions shall not harm another. Here we see 
 
29 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 581 
30 Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2018] UKSC 50 
31 General Medical Council (2013) Good medical practice: General Medical Council. <https://www.gmc-
uk.org/ethical-guidance/ethical-guidance-for-doctors/good-medical-practice> accessed 8 March 2020 
Health & Care Professions Council (2016) Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics. <https://www.hcpc-
uk.org/publications/standards/index.asp?id=38> accessed 8 March 2020 
Nursing and Midwifery Council (2018) The Code for Nurses and Midwives. London: Nursing and Midwifery 
Council. <https://www.nmc.org.uk/standards/code/read-the-code-online/> accessed 8 March 2020 
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that the participation of the SDC complicates an otherwise straightforward assessment of where 
the duty of care lies. 
3. ‘Fair, just and reasonable’ 
The third component of the Caparo guidelines is more challenging to apply, not least because 
it is seen as ancillary to the requirement of proximity and that it encapsulates policy 
considerations that may more usually be the province of Parliament.32 
Firstly, there is no general duty of care to prevent damage being inflicted by third parties.33 
Given that the AIS is unable to dispense treatments without the cooperation of a clinician, this 
is a reason for denying the extension of the duty of care to encompass SDCs. But the AIS has 
been designed specifically to influence the actions of clinicians to directly affect the health 
status of the patient. The general rule is that there is no duty of care for persons to prevent harm 
being caused by third parties, yet a ‘special relationship’ may be possible, which would 
override the conduct of others; as in, for example, the recent case of ABC v St George’s 
Healthcare NHS Trust.34 Here, the Court of Appeal found that a claim based on a ‘special 
relationship’ between an NHS trust and a patient’s unborn grandchild was sufficient to be 
arguable at trial35 and was recently confirmed on the facts in the High Court.36 Thus, it is not 
inconceivable that the courts might consider that there are grounds to argue that a ‘special 
relationship’ exists between the patient and the SDC, even though there is no case law to 
illustrate a duty of care between the SDC and the patient at present. If the system has been 
 
32 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310, 410; Michael v Chief Constable of South 
Wales [2015] AC 1732, [156]-[158] 
33 Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241 
34 [2017] EWCA Civ 336; 160 BMLR 19 
35 J Mackenzie (2017) The Medical Duty of Care to a Third Party 
<https://www.anthonygold.co.uk/latest/blog/medical-duty-care-third-party/>accessed 8 March 2020 
36 [2020] EWHC 455. 
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deployed with that specific purpose, it could be argued that it is unreasonable that the SDC’s 
legal responsibility for the effect of the system is negated by the clinician using it. 
Secondly, an SDC may argue that an AIS is no substitute for skilled, clinical decision-making 
and that the law only imposes a standard of care commensurate with the level of specialism 
which the defendant holds themselves out as possessing.37 . If a SDC wished to transfer legal 
responsibility for using the AIS to the clinical user, they would therefore present it as merely 
‘assisting’ clinicians in their decision-making, but would not claim that it is of the standard to 
substitute a clinician in the speciality that the system advises in. Based on this premise, it might 
be argued that it is unfair and unreasonable to assign negligence liability to the SDC which 
created and supplied that system.  
A clinician would, however, be unlikely to consider using an AIS they believe would make 
recommendations which are inferior to their own calculations; to do so would be illogical, 
counter-productive and would expose a patient to needless risk. In the example of IBM’s 
Watson for Oncology, the system is portrayed by the SDC as possessing the expertise of 
‘leading oncologists’.38 The reported use of this system by UB Songdo hospital39 is concerning 
if they had been informed that Watson makes recommendations rather than clinical decisions,40 
thus resulting in the risk of system use being borne by its clinical user. UB Songdo Hospital 
must have been convinced that Watson wassufficiently sophisticated to perform that role; in 
 
37See Philips v William Whiteley Ltd [1938] 1 All ER 566 where the court held that a jeweller did 
not claim to be of the same standard as a surgeon, and that the appropriate standard of care 
was of a reasonable jeweller undertaking ear piercing and not the reasonable surgeon.  
38 IBM (undated) IBM Watson for Oncology: What Watson for Oncology can do for your organization 
<https://www.ibm.com/products/clinical-decision-support-oncology> accessed 8 March 2020 
39 C Ross and I Swetlitz, (2017) ‘IBM pitched Watson as a revolution in cancer care. It's nowhere close’. STAT 
News. <https://www.statnews.com/2017/09/05/watson-ibm-cancer/> accessed 8 March 2020 
40 M Hengstler, E Enkel and S Duelli, ‘Applied artificial intelligence and trust – the case of autonomous 
vehicles and medical assistance devices’ (2016) 105 Technological Forecasting and Social Change 105, 115 
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the absence of universally accepted standards, individual institutions must assess each AIS’s 
adequacy on a system-by-system basis.  
A preference for extending the duty of care to the SDC might exist if there is sufficient 
foreseeability of harm and a convincing relationship of proximity between the SDC and the 
patient. This could be too challenging for the courts to accept as the clinician is acting at the 
bedside whereas the SDC is not. Yet, the SDC is acting for the benefit of the patient 
notwithstanding that the clinician is the intended recipient of the AIS’s recommendations and 
there is an interesting analogy here with the case of  Smith v Eric S Bush.41 The defendant 
surveyor was instructed by a building society to report on a property being purchased by the 
claimant.In addition to the surveyor owing a duty of care to the building society to carry out 
the inspection with due skill and care, the surveyor owed a duty to the third party purchaser on 
the basis that the defendant would know there was an ‘overwhelming probability’ that the 
purchaser would also rely on that report. Similarly, there is an ‘overwhelming probability’ that 
if the recommendation given to the clinician is negligent, its impact will be felt by the patient. 
This analogy reinforces the argument for extending the duty of care to the remote patient.42 
Similarly, if the AIS is a ‘black box’, meaning that the clinician cannot interrogate its reasoning, 
it might be ‘fair, just and reasonable’ that the SDC should owe a duty of care to the patient too, 
independently of any negligent conduct on the part of the clinician. 
The Caparo principles were not intended to cover all future scenarios, but to guide the court’s 
consideration of novel fact situations. We argue in favour of imposing a duty on the SDC in 
addition to any claims against the clinician so that risks are appropriately managed and 
contained. 
 
41 [1990] UKHL 1.  
42 [1990] UKHL at [26], per Lord Griffiths. 
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B. Breach of duty 
As previously mentioned, clinical conduct is not considered negligent if it satisfies the Bolam-
Bolitho calibration of the standard of care. If a duty of care is found to exist for the SDC, their 
system would need to be in accordance with a responsible body of opinion and the expert 
evidence supporting the defendant’s conduct or decision must ‘withstand logical analysis’. We 
consider how this calibration of the standard of care could apply to the SDC. 
The AIS might advise contrary to the expectations of the clinician, but that might not 
necessarily be negligent as long as the system’s recommendations are safe and therapeutic for 
the patient.43 In safety critical areas it is desirable that an SDC strives to follow, and even 
surpass, the relevant standards for medical devices.44 Healthcare is recognised as a safety 
critical area; any incorrect advice from an AIS has the potential to harm the target patient. 
An SDC could demonstrate discharging their duty of care through observation of the standards 
and codes of practice relevant to their profession.45 The notion of observation of standards is 
supported in comparative case law from New Zealand. In Bevan Investments v Blackhall & 
Struthers46 the defendant engineer had achieved the expected standard, and so it was held that 
upon rational analysis the court could conclude that no negligence had occurred. Codes of 
conduct and professional standards are in place for clinicians,47 however technical standards 
 
43 Luxmore-May v Messenger May Baverstock [1990] 1 All ER 1067 
44 D Rowland and JJ Rowland, ‘Competence and legal liability in the development of software for safety-related 
applications’ (1993) 2 Information & Communications Technology Law 229 
45 D Rowland and JJ Rowland, ‘Competence and legal liability in the development of software for safety-related 
applications’ (1993) 2 Information & Communications Technology Law 229, 236 
46 (1979) 11 BLR 78 
47 General Medical Council (2013) Good medical practice: General Medical Council. <https://www.gmc-
uk.org/ethical-guidance/ethical-guidance-for-doctors/good-medical-practice> accessed 8 March 2020 
Health & Care Professions Council (2016) Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics. <https://www.hcpc-
uk.org/publications/standards/index.asp?id=38> accessed 8 March 2020 
Nursing and Midwifery Council (2018) The Code for Nurses and Midwives. London: Nursing and Midwifery 
Council. <https://www.nmc.org.uk/standards/code/read-the-code-online/> accessed 8 March 2020 




are not yet sufficiently advanced in the domain of AI assisted medicine to provide definitive 
guidance to SDCs. 
Generalised codes of conduct exist in many forms, but without teeth or unification.48 Clinical 
practice standards need to be sector-specific, or even health condition-specific before medical 
experts and the public could be reliably assured of the safety of AI devices and algorithms. UK 
clinicians are aided by organisations such as the National Institute of Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) which publishes evidence-based guidance on clinical conditions and 
treatment pathways.49 However, NICE has not evaluated AIS for use in treatment pathways. 
Instead, NHSX, a unit dedicated to digital transformation of the NHS,50 is working on standard 
setting in this area.  This is supported by the release of NICE’s Evidence Standards Framework 
for Digital Health Technologies.51 Whilst we do not have a body of knowledge from which the 
courts may draw comparisons at this moment in time, initiatives such as this will begin to build 
that knowledge base and the standards of conduct which SDCs should adhere to for the courts 
to draw upon in the future. Although the standard of care in negligence and the standards set 
out in the various sources of published guidance are not necessarily the same, courts often rely 
heavily on professional guidance to inform the standard the law should apply. For example, in 
 
48 Access Now, The Toronto declaration: protecting the rights to equality and non-discrimination in machine 
learning systems (16 May 2018) <www.accessnow.org/the-toronto-declaration-protecting-the-rights-to-equality-
and-non-discrimination-in-machine-learning-systems> accessed 8 March 2020; Association for Computing 
Machinery, ACM code of ethics and professional conduct (2018) <www.acm.org/code-of-ethics> accessed 8 
March 2020Future of Life Institute, Asilomar principles (2017) <https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles> accessed 
3 June 2019; Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Ethically aligned design (2019) 
<https://ethicsinaction.ieee.org> accessed 8 March 2020; The Public Voice, Universal guidelines for artificial 
intelligence (2018) <https://thepublicvoice.org/ai-universal-guidelines/memo> accessed 8 March 2020. 
49 National Institute of Health and Care Excellence <www.nice.org.uk/guidance> accessed 8 March 2020 
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data-and-technology> accessed 8 March 2020 
51 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, Evidence Standards Framework for Digital Health 
Technologies (2019) <https://www.nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do/our-programmes/evidence-standards-
framework-for-digital-health-technologies> accessed 8 March 2020 
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Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board52 the Supreme Court expressed doctors’ duties to 
inform patients as closely aligned with General Medical Council (GMC) guidance on the matter.  
If the AIS is thought to be so risky that its outputs need to be verified by a clinician, the court 
might find it hard to accept that a system’s outputs are effective substitutes for the professional 
standards of clinical staff (and that it thereby does not satisfy the Bolam-Bolitho standard of 
care). AIS outputs are not the same as the evidence-based medicine upon which modern clinical 
practice is grounded. However, the clinician may not have the skills to appraise the AIS which 
has been offered to them. Additionally, there is no peer reviewed evidence base which the 
clinician may draw upon to ensure that using the AIS would result in an improvement in care. 
These two issues create a problem of non-translatability from the body of knowledge offered 
by the AIS to the clinical environment. When presenting an AIS for appraisal and use by 
clinicians, a SDC would need to be circumspect in their conduct to avoid misrepresentation of 
their product as equivalent to the work of ‘the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing 
to have that special skill’.53 Advertising exaggerations regarding AIS’s may shape liability 
under the Consumer Protection Act 54  and give rise to claims under contract law for 
misrepresentation, but the crux of the matter is that the conduct of SDCs as interdisciplinary 
specialists could be used as evidence that the SDCs ought to have known that defects in their 
system would be highly likely to inflict harm, putting them in breach of their duty of care for 
not taking active steps to avoid such harm. 
C. Causation 
This paper has already touched upon causation in the earlier discussion of factual causation in 
section III. Broadly speaking, the two major views are that either a) ‘but for’ the malfunctioning 
 
52 [2015] UKSC 11 
53 Bolam v Friern Barnet Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118, 121 
54 Consumer Protection Act 1987, s 3(2) 
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AIS the clinician would not have been prompted to apply the harmful recommendation to the 
patient, or b) that a clinician openly acknowledging that they do not have the skills of a 
specialist clinician does not relieve them of a negligence claim should harm eventuate when 
they have used an AIS which makes recommendations in that specialist area. However, if the 
court holds that the SDC shares responsibility with the clinician for the patient’s harm, the 
court must consider how multiple causes may be related. 
When multiple factors and/or multiple tortfeasors are determined as having caused injury, the 
courts use different methods to determine the cause responsible for the injury. The tortfeasors’ 
‘independency’ approach finds that each factor had caused a single damage independently of 
other factors. 55  By contrast, the tortfeasors’ ‘separate impact’ approach differs from 
tortfeasor’s independency as multiple injuries are attributed to separate tortfeasors. 56 
Tortfeasors’ contribution exists when multiple tortfeasors all acted and the sum of the acts are 
treated as creating the damage.57 The use of these three approaches can make it challenging to 
predict the outcome of a claim.58 
Suppose the clinician and the AIS independently make identical errors. Specifically, if a 
defective AIS produced an erroneous output which could harm the patient if followed, is the 
effect of this error eliminated by the clinician’s independent conduct? In Performance Cars v 
Abraham59 it was held that the first act may obliterate the second. One may be able to say that 
both actions were tortious and conclude that the effect of the first act (the negligent 
development of the AIS) continues in spite of subsequent negligence.60 The SDC’s negligence 
would take priority in this instance, because reference to the AIS would precede the clinician’s 
 
55 E Noee, M Noee, and A Mehrpouyan. (2016) ‘Attribution of Liability among Multiple Tortfeasors under 
Negligence Law: Causation in Iran and England.’ Journal of Politics and Law. 9 (7) p.219-229 p.221 
56 Ibid. p.224 
57 Ibid. p.223 
58 Ibid. p.221 
59 [1962] QB 33 
60 Performance Cars Ltd v Abraham [1962] 1 QB 33; Heil v Rankin [2001] PIQR Q3 
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conduct. However, this might unduly relieve clinicians from acting in the patient’s best 
interests and raise a moral hazard, encouraging reckless behaviour. As such, the ‘consecutive 
cause’ approach may not provide the best means for balancing the responsibility of the clinical 
and technical parties in ensuring that the AIS is developed and used in a way that guarantees 
patient safety. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the Performance Cars doctrine is 
applicable here as the ‘conduct’ of the SDC, as expressed through the AIS tool, and that of the 
clinician are not truly independent of each other. 
Where the ‘but for’ approach to causation fails, the patient may be able to satisfy the causation 
element of a claim by proving that the negligence ‘materially contributed to the damage’, and 
if successful, the defendant may be liable in full for the whole of the damage, notwithstanding 
that they have only been proved to contribute to it.61 However, where the damage suffered is 
treated as ‘indivisible’ (as seems to be the case with many cancers), the parties might argue 
that liability on the basis of being responsible for a ‘material increase of risk’ is the more 
appropriate claim.62 The jury is still out however on whether this more liberal approach to 
proving causation will ever be applied outside the so called ‘toxic torts’ or industrial diseases 
cases.63 If arguable, the material increase of the risk approach to causation might be applied 
where both the clinician and the AIS independently make the same error but as each confirms 
the other, it is impossible to prove which entity contributed more to the harm suffered by the 
patient. But, both aforementioned arguments depend on the SDC’s AIS being accepted as an 
authoritative source. If the recommendations given by an AIS is not accepted as such, it could 
 
61 See Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613, Bailey v Ministry of Defence [2008] EWCA Civ 1052 
and John v Central Manchester and Manchester Children’s Hospital University Hospitals NHS Trust [2016] 
EWHC 407. 
62 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32 
63 See e.g. John v Central Manchester and Manchester Children’s Hospital University Hospitals NHS Trust 
[2016] EWHC 407. 
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be argued that the clinician should have made their own independent check on the 
appropriateness of an AIS’s recommendations. 
If a court were to approve of the ‘material increase of risk’ approach to proving causation, it is 
necessary to outline the limitations on obtaining compensation that this entails. According to 
Barker,64 liability for a ‘material increase of risk’ is to be apportioned severally, meaning that 
a patient claimant or a clinician co-defendant may not be able to claim the appropriate 
contribution to damages from the SDC. Several liability is recommended by the European 
Commission whose report directly considered liability for AISs.65 Yet, under a several liability 
regime, the claimant must succeed in their claim against each defendant separately in order to 
receive compensation in full for the negligently inflicted injury, which adds additional 
unnecessary costs and minimises the prospect of obtaining full compensation for the harm 
suffered.66 This could discourage claimants from pursuing justice from an SDC and mean that 
the incentive for SDCs to fulfil their duty of care is weakened. In Section VI below, we argue 
for a return of joint liability to ensure that the patient has access to a timely legal remedy. 
In Section III it was shown that the AIS is unable to inflict harm without the conduct of the 
clinician as an intermediary. It would therefore be advantageous to the SDC to argue that the 
conduct of the clinician is a novus actus interveniens. Actions of third parties do not generally 
break the chain of causation unless the intervening conduct is so outrageously negligent that it 
would not be fair for the initial defendant to continue to carry responsibility for those later 
acts.67 Suppose the clinician had failed to recognise that a treatment recommendation was 
inappropriate to the patient, despite a reasonable expectation that they ought to have known 
 
64 Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] 2 AC 572 
65 Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies – New Technologies Formation. (2019) Liability for 
Artificial Intelligence and other emerging digital technologies. European Union: European Commission 
<https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc&docid=36608> 
accessed 8 March 2020 
66 Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] 2 AC 572 
67 Spencer v Wincanton [2009] EWCA Civ 1404 
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such a treatment could harm the patient. If they then acted solely on the basis of the defective 
AIS recommendation, the clinician may well find themselves causally responsible. In this case, 
the court may be minded to hold that these are two separate instances of negligent acts. Instead 
of the Performance Cars approach where the harm caused by the initial act is deemed to 
continue, here the situation is reversed. Under the novus actus interveniens doctrine, any 
‘extraordinary’ latter conduct of the clinician could obliterate the defects latent in the AIS, 
which may remain undiscovered. If the spirit of Bolam is that the clinician would need to have 
achieved the standards of other professionals, then the clinician may have failed to achieve this 
standard if they had failed to identify that an AI’s recommendation was inappropriate for a 
specific patient. 
Does the clinician professing to their patient that they do not have the skills of a specialist 
clinician relieve them of the usual standard of care? Likely not when considering the objective 
standard of care as illustrated by Nettleship v Weston;68 if ‘the certainty of a general standard 
is preferable to the vagaries of a fluctuating standard’69 then the standard expected of a clinician 
offering specialist treatment for a specific condition ought be determined of an acceptable 
standard as per a specialist clinician’s practice, rather than of a non-specialist clinician offering 
specialist treatment of which they are not qualified. This principle was confirmed in the recent 
case of FB v Princess Alexandra Hospital NHS Trust 70  where it was found that, when 
considering liability, the standard of a doctor’s care is not to be adjusted to take into account 
their limited experience.  
In the absence of a definitive pronouncement by the court on the causation issues raised in this 
paper regarding the presence of the AIS, it is impossible to accurately predict how far causation 
 
68 [1971] 2 QB 691 
69 Ibid. at 707 
70 [2017] EWCA Civ 334 
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principles will be central to the future development of the law. Nevertheless, we have shown 
that the common law is not closed on these matters, meaning that there is a real possibility that 
SDCs may be liable in negligence for defective AISs in clinical settings. 
D. Using volenti as a defence 
The characterisation of IBM Watson for Oncology as a recommendation engine suggests that 
the technical community may adopt a strategy of excluding their liability in negligence.71 The 
injured patient would be the claimant, so are not party to a contract between the SDC and the 
clinician. Thus, despite their pronouncements that the clinician retains ultimate responsibility 
for patient care, in law this is not the SDC’s choice to make. A defendant cannot exclude 
liability for negligently caused death or personal injury,72 so this tactic might prove to be an 
inadequate defence in a negligence claim brought by a patient. 
Thus, a defendant SDC’s option for a full defence might be limited to arguing volenti non fit 
injuria. In medical contexts, this principle contains the following elements: consent must be 
given voluntarily by the patient73 and they must be of sound mind.74 The patient is also entitled 
to be provided with information about all the relevant factors so that they can formulate their 
decision.75 
Questions could be raised about whether it is possible for the patient to voluntarily agree to the 
use of a ‘black box’ AIS, where its processes are largely unknowable and inscrutable in precise 
detail. It is reasonable that a patient would want to know if a system they were about to use 
might produce faulty outputs which might harm them before consenting to its use. A prudent 
patient may wish to demand that the SDCs quantify the risks before engaging with their 
 
71 M Hengstler, E Enkel, and S Duelli, ‘Applied artificial intelligence and trust – the case of autonomous 
vehicles and medical assistance devices’ (2016) 105 Technological Forecasting and Social Change 105 
72 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 s 2(1) 
73 Smith v Charles Baker & Sons [1891] AC 325 
74 Kirkham v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [1990] 2 QB 283 
75 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 
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products. With this knowledge they may choose to not permit the use of an AIS in their care. 
On the other hand, if the patient did choose to permit use of the AIS knowing of the risk of 
potentially harmful recommendations being produced, they would be wise to consider a low 
threshold to seeking verification by a clinician prior to accepting the treatment which the AIS 
had recommended. Volenti in any case is a very unlikely defence in a medical negligence action; 
it is only rarely successful and in very limited circumstances.76 
V. RISK POOLING 
The present state of the law does not account for the way that SDCs might perpetrate harms 
from a distance. In conventional negligence liability, the principles of proximity (with regard 
to the duty of care) and remoteness (in respect of the damage caused) are used to delimit the 
legal responsibility for acts or omissions to the parties that are most directly connected to the 
harm. This arises out of the notion that ‘fault’ ought to be the basis of liability;77 the broader 
the definition of liability, the greater the likelihood that ‘fault’ is applied to parties whom 
society might otherwise perceive as morally innocent, or whose conduct is justifiable and 
excusable.  
Another basis for awarding damages is that it provides a deterrence signal to potential 
tortfeasors.78 Ultimately, claimants would rather that their injuries had never occurred; the 
threat of being forced to pay financial compensation is one way to encourage parties to consider 
their actions carefully. Closely related to this is the idea that liability promotes the efficient 
‘internalisation’ of costs in risky activities.79 Therefore, the defendant is generally the party 
 
76 See J.McHale and J. Laing, (eds) Principles of Medical Law (OUP, 2010) at 6.73. 
77 P Cane and J Goudkamp, (2018) Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
78 D Schwarcz and P Siegelman, (2015) Research Handbook on the Economics of Insurance Law. Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar p.96 
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who could have avoided the harm at the least cost. Hence, compensation is a redistributive 
obligation that seeks to restore economic equilibrium amongst participants. 
It is this latter view that reflects the position of the three parties introduced in Section II. The 
clinician has a clear obligation to act in the best interests of their patient. The SDCs ought to 
design their system so that is ‘fail safe’; minimising the risk of harm when defects occur and 
forestalling the ‘atrophy of vigilance’ phenomenon. Likewise, the patient could have taken 
steps to avoid harm by interrogating the safety aspects of the AIS but has been prevented from 
doing so due to the ‘black box’ character of these systems (thus their consent is vitiated). 
The patient is clearly deserving of compensation if they have suffered unnecessary harm, so 
the question becomes one of how the patient claimant’s loss is best distributed and rectified. 
The present article argues that liability for damages ought to be shared among the stakeholders 
in medical AI devices and algorithms, involving both the technical and medical teams as they 
jointly contribute to the overall risk of harm. Yet, there is also a concurrent tension inherent in 
the desire to innovate and provide an environment where beneficial technologies can be tested 
and deployed rapidly in front-line care. 
The UK government proposes that liability insurance may help to balance the risk between 
actors and provide clear accountability among participants in sensitive sectors.80 If an actor can 
envisage a duty of care arising from their actions, insurance can help to defray some of the 
costs of engaging in risky activity. Indeed, in some instances, purchasing insurance to cover 
the minimum expected liability is compulsory.81 But in order to insure against harms, there 
needs to be a clear model of how restitution for that loss is to be implemented. 
 
80 Government Office for Science, Artificial intelligence: opportunities and implications for the future of 
decision making (GS/16/19, 2016) 15 
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16-19-artificial-intelligence-ai-report.pdf> accessed 8 March 2020 
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Allain, writing from a US perspective, suggests that the ‘enterprise liability’ approach may 
satisfy the interests of all parties.82 Enterprise liability is broadly identified by Klemme as the 
imperative that ‘losses to society created or caused by an enterprise or, more simply, by an 
activity, ought to be borne by that enterprise or activity’.83 The fault of each actor within an 
‘enterprise’ might well be covered by either a singular insurance paid for by both the SDC and 
the clinician or by separate policies which reduce the impact on each individual in the event of 
a claim.84  
Allain proposed that the user of devices such as IBM Watson be indemnified with insurance 
which combines aspects of product liability and vicarious liability as well as medical 
malpractice and allows the spread of fault between the clinicians using the system, the SDCs 
who have developed the system and the hospital where the system is being used. The enterprise 
liability model reduces the burden on claimants as the court will not need to analyse each 
actor’s role in the claimant’s misfortune, but instead look at the actions of the team in toto. In 
this way, ‘insurance acts to better spread the risk of loss throughout society reducing the 
economic impact of each individual judgment’.85 
Allain proposes that restitution to the claimant would be shared equally between the SDC who 
has supplied the system and the clinician or hospital who has adopted the system.86 She argues 
that if stakeholders equally share the burden of loss, the risk of loss is shared across all actors 
resulting in reduced economic disincentives. This would encourage SDCs to ensure that their 
system is as accurate as possible, and hospital management teams can be reassured that they 
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will not be left to shoulder the full cost without appropriate contributions or reimbursement 
from their technical partners. 
However, it is debatably not enterprise liability if the economic impact of a claim is assigned 
to an insurer rather than directly impacting the actors who caused the harm. Loss-spreading 
using insurance allows the shifting of liability to almost a community-wide basis. This paper 
identifies that loss-spreading and enterprise liability are distinct, and the scenario relies upon 
actors purchasing insurance which covers their activities.  
Insurance is beneficial if society accepts that the introduction of AIS in clinical decision-
making is, on balance, beneficial to the public and the adoption of this technology is deemed 
as collectively in society’s interest. If the SDC and the clinician must obtain insurance for use 
of an AIS to be permissible in the clinical decision-making context, the cost of paying for that 
insurance shall fall upon those who pay for the healthcare provided. Therefore, rather than 
considering the SDC and the clinician as paying for the required insurance, it is in fact the 
patient or those who pay for the patient’s care who are burdened with that cost; the community 
truly does carry the cost of liability when seen this way.  
Enterprise liability may lead to parties other than the insurer being liable. For example, if the 
clinician uses a recommendation which leads to patient injury and the insurance policy’s 
wording does not cover this tort, the insurance might not benefit the injured patient; thus, 
negating the enterprise’s intention of obtaining insurance. As a solution, this paper identifies 
the use of ‘risk pooling’ to reflect stakeholders’ collective acceptance and preparation for the 
potential for harm to arise when AISs are used in clinical decision-making.  
Song defines risk pooling as:  
‘…if X performs an action which imposes an unreasonable risk of harm on Y, then X is 
liable to Y, and therefore obliged to make an ex ante compensation into a social pool 
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that is roughly equivalent to the cost of expected harm (i.e., the probability of actual 
harm multiplied by the amount of the cost incurred by the harm).’87 
Merkin and Steele speak of insurance operating under an ‘actuarial model’ to spread risk across 
a discrete pool.88 A risk pool in this paper’s context could be a single insurance policy which 
charges each participant as per their own risk. Merkin and Steele describe the principle of 
stakeholders receiving what they have paid in89 which would be fair to other members of the 
risk pool. Yet, they warn that although risk pools may be well defined, they are rarely 
homogenous and that there is no requirement for premiums to be allocated as per the class of 
risk,90 and so premiums could be unfairly costed between stakeholders. For example, the 
clinician is closer to the patient and is in the position of being the final decision-maker in 
clinical decision-making. Therefore, they hold a larger proportion of immediate responsibility 
than the SDC. If the clinician has not used the system in the way intended, it is not just or 
reasonable for the SDC to subsidise the clinician’s wrongs. Nevertheless, if the clinician has 
used the AIS appropriately and was unable to detect a system error, the SDC ought to make a 
contribution commensurate with their involvement in creating the risk of harm in the first place. 
Additionally, there is the problem of ‘moral hazard’: just because an act is insured does not 
mean that it is free of responsibility.91 Thus, if an AIS is insured by all concerned stakeholders 
and there is still a potential risk of injuring a patient through using it, the provision of insurance 
cover does not morally excuse that the AIS had been deployed when foreseeable harm could 
take place. If it is preferable that AISs are tools and that human actors must not pass 
responsibility for harms to AISs, intentionally shifting responsibility for harms from human 
 
87 F Song, (2018) ‘Regarding a Risk-Pooling System of compensation.’ Ratio. 32(1)139-149 p.140 
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actors to an insurance policy could be seen as similarly responsibility-avoidant behaviour. But 
whilst the use of AI in clinical decision-making is currently novel, the use of insurance to offset 
non-intentional risk has long been accepted by society. If society accepts the use and risks of, 
using AI in clinical decision-making, it is conceivable that risk pooling would be accepted here 
too for non-intentional harms. 
A. Risk pooling in England and Wales: proposals for reform 
There are no publicly discussed examples of application of insurance to AISs used in clinical 
decision-making, but the UK’s preparation for self-driving cars might be considered analogous. 
The Automated and Electric Vehicles (AEV) Act 2018 effectively enacts the proposal for risk 
pooling as the basis for a compulsory insurance scheme in the context of self-driving vehicles. 
This legislation requires that, in the event of an accident due to an automated car ‘driving itself’, 
the insurer is liable to pay out on any meritorious claim.92 The injured party has priority ahead 
of all other actors within the scenario and compensation is made available to the claimant 
without them facing the prospect of a lengthy and expensive court battle. The insurer may then 
later seek recovery from other parties whose conduct contributed to the accident, for example 
the vehicle manufacturer or other road users.93  
The scenario of an AIS being used for clinical decision-making would be comparable to what 
is described as a highly automated vehicle in the AEV Act. When a highly automated vehicle 
is used, a human remains in the loop; the Law Commission in this context advises that the user-
in-charge of the vehicle must remain either in the vehicle or within direct sight, they also retain 
responsibility to ensure roadworthiness and insurance.94 Thus, it may be envisaged that the user 
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of an AIS being used for clinical decision-making would need to be present to be considered 
the user and they should expect to be similarly held responsible to ensure suitability and 
appropriateness of the AIS they use. Because a human remains in charge of choosing to use 
the outputs from an AIS, an AEV-style Act could be of no additional benefit to the clinician as 
it would specify them as being in charge if they were the final user. Thus, if they acted 
negligently, a user could expect the insurer to attempt to recover from them the relevant 
proportion of damages awarded to an injured party.95  
The AEV Act is a proactive law which seeks to lessen uncertainty when considering the 
adoption of future technologies whilst risking regulatory disconnect when technology is later 
introduced.96 This paper has noted that there is a regulatory disconnect between the clinician, 
the SDC and the patient which leaves the clinician vulnerable to being burdened by potential 
negligence claims; there is an opportunity to proactively recognise this now so that shared 
responsibility for the use of an AIS in the clinical area could be realised via risk pooling in the 
future.  
The court may engage in detailed consideration of the legal issues as they apply to the 
defendants, for instance establishing whether the duty of care exists or dealing with problems 
of causation. Thus, additional distress is avoided by the injured party and they can commence 
their recovery journey sooner. A risk pooling insurance scheme would cover harms when they 
arise, but unlike Allain’s proposal, the defendants only contribute in accordance with the extent 
of their liability. 
1. Insurance schemes for clinical malpractice should include coverage for AI-related damage 
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Clinicians have a professional obligation to carry adequate insurance against injuries arising 
from their tortious conduct.97 They may additionally be subject to vicarious liability rules, 
whereby the employer is deemed to adopt the liability of the conduct of its employees. NHS 
bodies operate under a regime of self-insurance which is administered through NHS Resolution 
schemes.98 Private healthcare institutions may optionally take out public liability insurance 
which may supplement or replace the insurance coverage of the individual clinicians who work 
for them. SDCs can purchase public liability insurance which can indemnify their liability in 
negligence. Again, this is a voluntary undertaking. This means that coverage is patchy and 
could lead to inefficiencies compared to the risk pooling model. 
The modifications to insurance terms introduced under statute to deal with self-driving vehicles 
have the advantage that drivers must already carry compulsory insurance for risks to third 
parties.99 In order for claimants to receive the protection of the risk pooling scheme, it would 
be necessary for one or more of the stakeholders to be under a statutory obligation to hold 
compulsory insurance for harms related to AIS use. Insurers for clinical malpractice are best 
placed to process claims directly with patients. Rules directing that clinical insurers are liable 
to pay claims in the first instance would mean that the patient would not need to identify 
multiple potential defendants in order to pursue a claim.100 
The AEV Act 2018 again provides a useful pattern to follow. In Section IV it was 
acknowledged that software normally requires revisions over time as and when issues are 
discovered. The legislation for self-driving cars provides for this by instituting a rule that 
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insurers may exclude liability where the software has not been updated at the time of the 
accident.101 If a similar rule were to be introduced into clinical malpractice schemes, this would 
have the effect of encouraging hospitals to keep AISs up to date, with the by-product that 
patient care would be continually at the forefront of scientific and technical capability. The 
SDC has a duty to ensure that their system is safe. If they do not, they may be obliged to recall 
it or make it safe.102 If the SDC fails to make a system safe, for example, via an update, they 
have breached a statutory duty. Once this update is available, the clinician cannot claim against 
the insurance scheme if they have not updated the system. 
2. Insurance schemes for clinical malpractice should have powers to recover costs 
Although the insurer is intended to be the sole point of contact for a claimant, risk pooling does 
not require that the insurer fund the full amount of compensation from the insurer’s own 
reserves. The notion of risk pooling recognises that the totality of the damage is the result of 
numerous, sometimes undetectable, errors and mistakes. The actions or omissions of one party 
may indeed be the nearest cause to the damage in time and space, yet it is still legitimate to 
seek a contribution from co-defendants whose negligence also led to the occurrence of the 
damage.103 
This entitlement exists in statute;104 a modified power also exists for the insurer of a self-
driving vehicle to recover the costs of a claim award which has already been paid to the 
claimant.105 In this sense, the insurer acts as a centralised claims administrator but can also 
investigate specific incidents in more depth. An individual claimant may only be able to amass 
enough evidence to merit a claim against some defendants but not others. Meanwhile, insurers 
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can mobilise their institutional resources in preparing a claim. Moreover, they are incentivised 
to seek contributions from other parties as it can eliminate or reduce the burden on the insured 
community, thereby keeping premiums at competitive rates. 
3. Several liability should be abolished 
The power to recover costs or seek financial contribution to an award of damages rests on the 
model of joint liability, as was expressed in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.106 
Joint liability is a legal fiction with a pragmatic purpose; it acknowledges that early and full 
compensation is crucial for the claimant to have the stability to start their journey of recovery 
as soon as practicable. Risk pooling is grounded in the idea that the stakeholders who intend to 
benefit from their participation in a risky activity ought to accept moral and legal 
responsibilities to the individuals and communities that may suffer the consequences of when 
things go awry. 
The court in Barker v Corus UK Ltd107 erred in making liability for ‘material increase in the 
risk’ ‘several’, or proportionate to the defendant’s share of the risk exposure. It is argued here 
that any party that negligently exposes a claimant to a risk of harm via an AI system used in 
health care should bear full responsibility for the damage if that risk materialises. If Parliament 
can recognise that the principle in Barker does injustice by mesothelioma claimants,108 then 
surely it must appreciate that the risks of AI-driven healthcare, and indeed other risky activities, 
are so inextricably linked between parties that joint liability should be restored. 
4. Patient consent should be restricted 
For some activities, the nature of the risk involved is so great that the law has seen fit to restrain 
unwitting claimants from granting effective consent as this would bar them from compensation 
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to which they might otherwise be entitled. For instance, it has been held that passengers are not 
able to form the necessary acceptance of risk required for the defence of volenti non fit injuria 
where the driver of the vehicle is intoxicated.109 Statute now excludes this defence in its entirety 
in road traffic accidents, because all drivers are required to have insurance in order for the 
speedy administration of justice to claimants.110 
A similar contention can be made in favour of patients who have been harmed as a result of 
defective AISs. As laypersons, patients cannot be expected to take the steps to safeguard their 
own interests, particularly when explanations of how some AISs operate are not readily 
forthcoming for commercial and technical reasons. Restricting the patient’s ability to consent 
to treatment by defective AISs would provide enhanced protection for vulnerable claimants. 
B. Advantages of risk pooling 
Risk pooling would only be ethically and professionally sound if schemes are fit for use. Justice 
would not be achieved if the compulsory insurance component of risk pooling was used to 
rationalise the rapid deployment of AISs just because one could rely on insurance to cover the 
risks. Nevertheless, if the risk pooling approach were to be adopted, insurance companies 
would drive up safety standards in order to protect their business. For example, insurers would 
be reluctant to enter into commercial partnerships where proof of compliance with technical 
standards as well as NICE and NHSX (2019) guidance is absent. 
Principle 10 of the NHSX Code of Conduct for Data-driven Health and Care Technology 
demands that ‘clear terms around who bears the liability should be established’,111 and it seems 
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that NHSX envisage that this will be the outcome of contractual negotiations between 
healthcare providers and SDCs.  
As standards become more detailed and based on empirical evidence, premiums could 
conceivably reduce (though this is essentially a question for actuaries, not lawyers). If the cost 
of insurance is prohibitive because the risks are very high, this financial inconvenience should 
be welcomed as it will prevent harmful systems from being used in clinical practice at a time 
when those risks cannot be effectively mitigated.  
VI. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE AND CONCLUSIONS 
The law addressing liability in the use of artificial intelligence for clinical decision-making is 
complex and ill-defined for non-legally minded stakeholders. Novus actus interveniens seems 
to protect the SDC whilst leaving the clinician vulnerable to negligence claims. It is difficult 
to assess with any certainty which claims would succeed or fail in this area as caselaw on the 
points raised in this article is non-existent and existing legal frameworks might not be 
desirable.112 There is an opportunity to take a proactive approach to ensure patient safety and 
compensation, thus, it is logical to have the insurance, standards, and regulation in place. 
If SDCs do not wish to risk caselaw determining whether or not they have a duty of care to the 
patients which their systems are trying to help, there is merit in their proactively embracing 
their potential duty of care to patients and to adopt industry agreed standards and codes of 
practice.  
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